Informal Consultation with Countries in Transition – Amani Africa
Tomorrow, December 17, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal session with governments in transition, specifically Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.
This marks the fourth time the PSC has used this informal format since April 2023, a method adopted after the PSC’s 14th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. The aim of the informal consultation is to directly engage with representatives from states suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government, drawing authority from Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. The discussion tomorrow is expected to review progress and challenges in ongoing transitions since the last meeting in March 2025.
Two developments have stood out since the previous session. First, Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar have experienced military coups, widening the scope of countries undergoing transitions to seven. Second, Gabon’s suspension was lifted despite its elections not meeting Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) concerning the ineligibility of coup leaders in elections aimed at restoring constitutional order. As highlighted in our April 2025 Monthly Digest, Gabon’s participation and victory—achieved in clear contravention of ACDEG—followed by the suspension’s lifting without a PSC affirmation of full adherence to Article 25(4), raises questions about AU’s declared zero-tolerance policy to coups. It signals to coup leaders and militaries elsewhere that the PSC may overlook full norm compliance if they move swiftly to “restore” constitutional order and hold elections.
Guinea’s coup leader and interim president, Mamady Doumbouya, appears ready to follow Gabon’s path as Guinea gears up for elections. The PSC is likely to discuss technical and financial support for credible elections and, echoing its 1284th session, stress the need for inclusivity in Guinea’s political process. Guinea’s delegation is expected to emphasize progress toward restoring constitutional order, notably the September 2025 constitutional referendum and the general elections slated for December 28, 2025, along with the electoral support the country seeks. These elections are meant to conclude Guinea’s transition. Yet Doumbouya’s early November entry into the presidential race—breaking a prior pledge not to run—poses a challenge. The PSC, during its May field mission to Conakry and its 1284th session, urged transition authorities to honor their commitment to complete the transition by December 2025, but stopped short of reminding them of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) prohibition on coup leaders contesting elections. With Doumbouya now a candidate and a likely victory, the PSC might apply the Gabon precedent unless ECOWAS raises concerns. In this context, whether other coup leaders will run in elections remains their choice and would likely escape AU pushback regarding non-compliance with ACDEG Article 24(5).
Sudan’s delegation may press for lifting the country’s suspension, citing the May 2025 appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as civilian Prime Minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who chairs the Transitional Sovereign Council and leads the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The AU Commission Chair welcomed the appointment as a step toward inclusive governance, but the move did not arise from broad national dialogue or involve Sudanese political and social forces. In light of this, calls to lift Sudan’s suspension remain premature given the ongoing security deterioration, lack of national dialogue, and no clear path to credible elections. The AU often regards national dialogue and elections as prerequisites to lifting sanctions, yet recent precedents show sanctions may be lifted when elections are held even if coup actors participate, which some view as a loophole. Sudan’s representative may also advocate a PSC field mission to Port Sudan. With recent developments including the fall of El Fasher, Darfur’s last major SAF stronghold, to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), signaling de facto partition and civilian casualties, the discussion may center on deploying civilian protection mechanisms and accelerating peace efforts aligned with prior PSC decisions on Sudan.
Madagascar will likewise feature prominently due to the October 2025 military takeover. A faction of the Madagascar Armed Forces, led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina, ousted President Andry Rajoelina amid mass protests in Antananarivo, triggering AU suspension for unconstitutional power seizure. The PSC has condemned the coup and urged restraint, inclusive dialogue, and a peaceful resolution within constitutional lines. In its November 20 session, the Council underscored the need for coordinated AU-SADC efforts, including high-level missions and a stronger AU on-the-ground presence to support mediation and stabilization. It also called for tighter AU-SADC-IA coordination with the Indian Ocean Commission, while requesting financial and technical support for the electoral management body and drafting a new constitution, with AFISIT funding contingent on implementing the Transition Road Map. Tomorrow’s consultation is expected to assess how regional and continental mechanisms align to support Madagascar’s return to democracy. In the other three countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—relations with ECOWAS remain tense as they deepen ties with a 2024 regional confederation. Security concerns are increasingly undermining transition progress. In Mali, the National Transitional Council passed a July 3, 2025 amendment to the Transitional Charter permitting General Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year term as President during the transition “until peace is restored.” In Burkina Faso, the transition was extended for another five years starting July 2024, with a charter allowing Traoré to run in elections. Niger adopted a similar path, with a February 2025 national conference deciding that the CNSP, which seized power in July 2023, would stay in power for five years with no clear election timeline.
The PSC is expected to reiterate concerns from its 1304th ministerial session on September 30, 2025, about the slow pace of political transitions, urging accelerated inclusive processes and genuine dialogue involving all stakeholders. It may again urge authorities to adhere to their transition roadmaps and to operationalize joint transition monitoring bodies.
Yet, progress cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader threats these countries face. Tomorrow’s session will likely explore how the AU and ECOWAS can overhaul their strategy, weaving the restoration of constitutional order into a broader stabilization and state-building framework, supported by a security mechanism for the Sahel that they develop and deploy with regional partners. In other words, the discussion should connect the transition process to the urgent counterterrorism and stabilization needs in the region.
As a result, the informal consultation should frame the transition discussion within the security challenges these states face and consider how the AU and ECOWAS can contribute to counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel. Unlike Gabon and Guinea, the push for transition progress cannot ignore the ongoing terrorism threat, which has reached existential importance for these nations. For instance, in Mali, Bamako faces imminent risk with JNIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate, intensifying operations from the north and center into the west and south. A fuel blockade since September has caused shortages, power outages, and economic paralysis, sparking public unrest. In response, Goïta has shuffled senior military leadership, signaling internal strain.
The PSC is also likely to review the AU’s intensified diplomacy with Sahel countries and how to better coordinate efforts. The AU Commission Chair met with representatives from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in Addis Ababa in May, followed by a visit from Angola’s Foreign Minister relaying messages from AU Chair President João Lourenço about Sahel stability and counterterrorism. In July, the AU appointed Burundi’s President Évariste Ndayishimiye as Special Envoy for the Sahel, and Angola proposed a Sahel summit in Luanda, a proposal welcomed by the PSC. Former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara was named Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL). A dedicated Task Force to support counterterrorism in the region was established, with a planned field visit by Special Envoy Ndayishimiye to engage directly with transitional authorities. The informal consult may use this meeting to advance these initiatives and follow up on the joint security framework discussed at the AU-ECOWAS consultative meeting in May to address insecurity in West Africa more effectively.
Beyond the Sahel, governance instability continues to widen across West Africa, highlighted by the Guinea-Bissau coup and an attempted coup in Benin, underscoring the increasing threat of unconstitutional power grabs and prompting ECOWAS to consider sanctions measures. The consultation is expected to address Guinea-Bissau’s situation after the November 26 coup, including the presidential runoff results. The military has claimed control over the presidency and key officials. In response, the AU suspended Guinea-Bissau from AU activities on November 28 and directed the AU PCRD Centre in Cairo, with UN peacebuilding partners, to engage national stakeholders in stabilizing development and preventing further crises. The PSC also called for an inclusive AU monitoring mechanism in collaboration with ECOWAS. ECOWAS, at its 68th Ordinary Session in December, rejected Guinea-Bissau’s transition plan and urged a prompt return to constitutional order, even threatening targeted sanctions on obstructors and sending a high-level delegation to engage the junta.
On Sudan, the AU will hear updates on the conflict, including the October 26 fall of El-Fasher to the RSF and reports of civilian harm and mass killings tied to the takeover. An emergency PSC meeting on October 28 condemned the violence and urged regular monitoring, civilian protection planning, and a fact-finding mission. The meeting also urged the AU to provide timely recommendations and to pursue genocide and mass atrocity prevention work. Tomorrow’s session could consider how Sudan can advance these tasks within a broader humanitarian protection and peace process framework.
As with prior informal consultations, no formal outcome document is anticipated from this session.
